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  What	   explains	   the	   almost	   negative	   impact	   of	   international	   factors	   on	   post-­‐Uprising	  democratization	  prospects?	  This	  article	  compares	   the	  utility	  of	   rival	   “diffusionist”	  and	  neo-­‐Gramscian	   political	   economy	   frames	   to	   explain	   this.	   Three	   international	   factors	  deter	   democratization.	   The	   failure	   of	  Western	   democracy	   promotion	   is	   rooted	   in	   the	  contradiction	   between	   the	   dominance	   of	   global	   finance	   capital	   and	   the	   norm	   of	  democratic	   equality;	   in	   the	   periphery,	   neo-­‐liberalism	   is	  most	   compatible	  with	   hybrid	  regimes	  and,	   at	  best,	   “low	   intensity	  democracy.”	   In	  MENA,	  neo-­‐liberalism	  generated	  a	  crony	   capitalism	   incompatible	   with	   democratization;	   while	   this	   also	   sparked	   the	  uprisings,	   these	   have	   failed	   to	   address	   class	   inequalities.	   Moreover	   at	   the	   normative	  level,	  MENA	  hosts	  the	  most	  credible	  counter-­‐hegemonic	  ideologies;	  the	  brief	  peaking	  of	  democratic	   ideology	   in	   the	   region	   during	   the	   early	   uprisings	   soon	   declined	   amidst	  regional	   discourse	   wars.	   Non-­‐democrats—coercive	   regime	   remnants	   and	   radical	  charismatic	   movements-­‐-­‐were	   empowered	   by	   the	   competitive	   interference	   of	   rival	  powers	   in	  Uprising	   states.	  The	   collapse	  of	  many	  Uprising	   states	   amidst	   a	   struggle	   for	  power	  over	  the	  region	  left	  an	  environment	  uncongenial	  to	  democratization.	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  Do	  international	  level	  variables	  advance	  or	  retard	  democratization	  in	  MENA?	  The	  Arab	  Uprising,	  when	  local	  agents	  finally	  embraced	  democratic	  discourse,	  seemed	  a	  sign	  that	  the	   globalization	   of	   democracy	   had	   finally	   overcome	   “Middle	   East	   exceptionalism.”	  Despite	   this,	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   international	   level	   on	   the	   Uprising	   has	   been	   almost	  uniformly	   negative.	   It	   has	   helped	   destabilize	   the	   region,	   but	   has	   done	   little	   to	   enable	  democratic	  transition,	  much	  less	  consolidation.	  	  	   The	  conventional	  democratization	  approach	   to	   the	   international	  variable	  might	  be	  called	  the	  diffusionist	  model	  by	  which	  democracy	  is	  exported	  from	  the	  Western	  core	  via	   a	   combination	   of	   emulation,	   leverage	   and	   linkage,	   with	   regional	   lags	   increasingly	  overcome	  by	  globalization-­‐driven	  homogenization.	  Although	  utilizing	  evidence	  by	  those	  working	   in	   this	   tradition,	   this	  article	  adopts	  an	  alternative	  neo-­‐Gramscian	  framework,1	  that	  sees	  the	  export	  of	  a	  “democratic”	  capitalist	  order	  to	  MENA	  as	  highly	  contingent.	  In	  this	  view,	  the	  stability	  of	  a	  global	  or	  regional	  order	  depends	  on	  congruence	  between	  the	  system	  of	  production	  and	   ideological	  hegemony	  promoted	  by	  global	   institutions	  and	  a	  hegemonic	   state.	  While	  MENA	  has	   been	   incorporated	   into	   circuits	   of	  Western	   finance	  capital	   and	   brought	   under	   US	   military	   hegemony,	   the	   hegemony	   of	   Western	   norms	  remains	   highly	   contested,	   the	   regions’	   alternative	   state	   formation	   pathways	   highly	  resilient,	   and	   on-­‐going	   power	   struggles	   over	   the	   region	   productive	   of	   norm	  fragmentation	  little	  congenial	  to	  democratization.	  	   The	  article	  first	  examines	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  international	  export	  of	  democratic	  capitalism	   in	   the	   age	   of	   globalization;	   then	   looks	   at	   its	   impact	   on	  MENA	   prior	   to	   the	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Uprising;	   and	   finally	   examines	   the	   impact	   of	   post-­‐2011	   international	   and	   regional	  power	  struggles	  in	  shaping	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  Uprisings.	  	  	  	   	  
Democratization	  within	  the	  frame	  of	  globalization	  Democratization,	  in	  the	  neo-­‐Gramscian	  view,	  must	  be	  understood	  within	  the	  framework	  of	   economic	   globalization,	   a	   process	   constituted	   by	   the	   internationalization	   of	  production	   and	   the	   dominance	   of	   Western	   finance	   capital	   and	   a	   Westcentric	  transnational	   corporate	   class.	   The	   globalization	   of	   capitalism	   requires	   the	   sustained	  agency	  of	  the	  global	  hegemon	  of	  the	  age,	  now	  the	  US,	  empowered	  by	  the	  dominance	  of	  its	  finance	  capital2	  and	  working	  through	  international	  financial	  institutions,	  to	  promote	  “disciplinary	  neo-­‐liberalism”3	  manifest	   in	   international	   contractual	   arrangements	   such	  as	  the	  World	  Trade	  Organization.	  Especially	  in	  the	  world	  periphery,	  the	  hegemon	  plays	  a	  key	  role	   in	   forcing	  open	  markets	   to	  Western	  penetration,	  using	  economic	  crises	  and	  debt	  relief	  to	  enforce	  neo-­‐liberal	  measures	  such	  as	  Anglo-­‐American	  legal	  practices,	  tariff	  removal,	   privatization	   and	   structural	   adjustment.4 	  The	   hegemon	   seeks	   thereby	   to	  transform	   states	   into	   transmission	   belts	   of	   global	   neo-­‐liberalism.5	  With	   the	   demise	   of	  Soviet	  countervailing	  power,	  this	  US	  project	  acquired	  enhanced	  leverage;	  e.g.	  war	  could	  again	   be	   used	   to	   force	   open	   the	   most	   recalcitrant	   and	   lucrative	   periphery	   markets,	  notably	  oil-­‐rich	  Iraq.6	  	  	   At	   the	   levels	   of	   institutions	   and	   ideology,	   sociological	   institutionalists	   (world	  polity	  theory)	  see	  a	  parallel	  process	  in	  which	  a	  world	  culture	  of	  capitalist	  democracy	  is	  diffused	  outward	  from	  core	  to	  periphery.7	  Buzan	  and	  Little	  noted	  that	  the	  expansion	  of	  European	  international	  society	  through	  imperialism,	  globalized	  a	  formally	  Westphalian	  states	   system	  and	   stimulated	   an	   internalization	   of	  Western	  norms	  of	   sovereignty	   and	  nationalism,	   that	   made	   denial	   of	   the	   independence	   of	   periphery	   too	   costly.8	  In	   a	  geopolitical	  dynamic	  recognizable	   to	  realists	  whereby	  the	   international	  system	  shapes	  the	   states,	   via	   socialization	   and	   emulation,	   a	   convergence	   in	   governance	   took	   place:	  since	   the	   capitalist	   national	   state	   is	   best	   able	   to	   mobilize	   power	   in	   international	  competition,	   all	   states	   emulated	   this	   model	   through	   defensive	   modernization.9	  In	   the	  era	  of	  de-­‐colonization,	   these	   twin	  dynamics	  propelled	  a	   real	  diffusion	  of	  power	   to	   the	  periphery;	   however,	   Clark	   showed	   that,	   to	   compensate,	   the	   core	   engineered	   the	  globalization	   of	   neo-­‐liberal	   practices,	   creating	   an	   international	   society	   of	   only	   semi-­‐sovereign	  states	  in	  the	  periphery.10	  	  	   What	   is	   the	   link	   between	  neo-­‐liberal	   globalization	   and	   democratization?	  While	  globalization	   created	   a	   capitalist	   global	   political	   economy	   that	   ostensibly	   facilitated	  democratization,	  Western	   states	   also	   actively	  manipulated	   it	   to	   export	   democracy.	   As	  theorized	   notably	   by	   Levitsky	   and	  Way11,	   globalization	   gave	  Western	   states	   leverage	  over	   weaker	   less	   developed	   countries	   (LDCs)	   via	   sanctions,	   diplomatic	   pressures,	  conditionality	   and	   intervention.	   However,	   their	   pressures	   were	   most	   effective	   where	  paralleled	  by	  linkage:socio-­‐economic	  penetration	  and	  interdependencies	  resulting	  from	  economic	  integration.	  Linkage,	  via	  diasporas,	  media	  penetration	  and	  the	  internet	  could	  tilt	   the	   internal	   power	   balance	   toward	   democratization,	   by	   creating	   and	   empowering	  constituencies	   pressing	   for	   it:	   Western-­‐financed	   transnational	   non-­‐governmental	  organization	   (NGO)	  networks	  built	  up	   civil	   society,	   and	  emergent	   regional	   elites	  were	  socialized	   through	   educational	   exchanges.	   Solingen 12 	  saw	   responsiveness	   to	   the	  Western	  democracy	  promotion	  as	  advanced	  by	  the	  rise	  inside	  non-­‐democratic	  regimes	  of	  business-­‐dominated	  “internationalist	  coalitions”	  at	   the	  expense	  of	  statist-­‐nationalist	  ones,	   a	   function	   of	   the	   move	   from	   bi-­‐polarity,	   when	   authoritarian	   national	   security	  states	   had	   been	   fostered	   by	   super-­‐power	   patrons,	   to	   a	   US-­‐centric	   neo-­‐liberal	   world	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empowering	   Western-­‐linked	   bankers,	   finance	   ministers,	   and	   trading	   bourgeoisies.	  Finnemore	  and	  Sikkink13	  showed	  that	  states	  were	  socialized	  into	  standards	  of	  “civilized”	  international	   society	   notably	   by	   international	   organizations	   and	   NGOs	   that	   linked	  external	  and	  internal	   liberal	  norm	  entrepreneurs,	  such	  as	  democratization	  activists,	   to	  spread	  norms	  domestically.	  Huntington14	  identified	  a	  “snowballing”	  effect	   in	  which	  the	  de-­‐legitimation	   of	   authoritarian	   governance	   made	   democracy	   appear	   to	   be	   the	   only	  legitimate	  form	  of	  rule	  and	  Rosenau15	  stressed	  how	  transnational	   linkages	  encouraged	  anti-­‐authoritarian	  movements	   to	   spill	   across	  borders,	   as	  was	   famously	   the	  case	   in	   the	  Arab	   spring.	   The	   dominant	   ideology	   was	   that	   economic	   success	   required	  democratization,	   which	   alone	   had	   the	   legitimacy,	   predictability	   and	   informational	  advantages	  needed	  to	  encourage	  investors	  and	  innovation-­‐-­‐while	  authoritarian	  regimes	  fostered	  economically	  counterproductive	  rent	  seeking.	  	  	   In	  parallel,	  as	  reflected	   in	   “World	  Society”16	  approaches,	   there	  was	  a	  normative	  shift	   from	   an	   international	   society	   based	   on	   sovereign	   equal	   states	   to	   one	   wherein	  sovereignty	  was	  made	  conditional	  on	  “good	  governance”	  and	  states’	   fulfilment	  of	  their	  “responsibility	   to	  protect,”	  with	  human	  rights	  violations	   justifying	   intervention—all	  as	  judged	  and	  implemented	  by	  the	  great	  powers,	  above	  all	  the	  US	  hegemon.	  The	  export	  of	  the	   non-­‐violent	   resistance	   paradigm,	   popularized	   by	   Gene	   Sharp	   and	   theorized	   by	  Stephan	  and	  Chenoweth17	  publicized	   the	   techniques	  by	  which	  activists	   could	  use	  non-­‐violent	   protest	   to	   provoke	   the	   collapse	   of	   authoritarian	   regimes;	   this	   is	   said	   to	   have	  played	  some	  role	  in	  inspiring	  the	  techniques	  of	  the	  Arab	  Uprising.	  Less	  often	  observed	  was,	   as	   Ayoob	   and	   Lustick 18 	  suggested,	   how	   human	   rights	   and	   democratization	  campaigns	  aimed	  to	  deprive	   late	  developing	  states,	   for	  better	  or	  worse,	  of	   the	   tools	  of	  violence	   earlier	   used	   in	   the	   consolidation	   core	   states,	   hence	   perpetuating	   state	  weakness	  in	  the	  periphery	  that	  sustained	  core	  dominance	  over	  it.	  	   	  These	   one-­‐way	   diffusionist	   models	   capture	   important	   tendencies,	   but	   greatly	  oversimplify	   reality,	   in	   neglecting	   three	   important	   counter-­‐realities.	   Firstly,	   there	   is	  arguably	  a	  contradiction	  within	  the	  norm	  package	  exported	  by	  globalization	  that	  works	  against	  smooth	  norm	  diffusion.	  Thus,	  paradoxically,	  even	  as	  globalization	  appears	  to	  be	  an	  engine	  in	  the	  horizontal	  spread	  of	  democratization,	  it	  paradoxically	  also	  dilutes	  it:	  in	  locking	  states	  into	  trade	  pacts	  that	  remove	  much	  economic	  policy,	  particularly	  economic	  rights,	   from	  political	  contestation,	  democracy	  is	  hollowed	  out	  as	  the	  economic	  policies	  of	   all	   political	   parties	   converge	   on	   the	   neo-­‐liberal	   consensus,	   big	   money	   and	   big	  corporate	  media	  manipulate	  elections	  and	  electorates	  are	  de-­‐politicised	  or	   set	  against	  each	  other	  over	   race	  and	   immigration	   issues.	  The	   function	  of	   states	   changes	   from	   the	  provision	   of	   social	   needs	   to	   disciplining	   their	   societies	   as	   needed	   to	   attract	   global	  finance	   capital	   via	   a	   “race	   to	   the	   bottom;”	   the	   state	   becomes	   more	   accountable	   to	  transnational	  capital	  and	   less	   to	   its	  citizenry.	   In	   the	  periphery,	   the	  consequences	  have	  been	   particularly	   damaging.	   While	   in	   the	   core,	   Sorensen	   observed,	   19 	  democratic	  consolidation	  was	  normally	  accompanied	  by	  periods	  of	  growing	  affluence	  and	  equality,	  globalization	   produces	   inequality	   on	   a	   world	   scale20	  and,	   as	   Boix21	  found,	   this	   high	  inequality	  undermined	  democratization	  in	  the	  periphery.	  What	  the	  West	  exported	  to	  the	  periphery	  was	  democratic	  procedure	  without	  the	  substance	  of	  political	  equalization,	  or,	  in	   Robinson’s	   words,	   “low	   intensity	   democracy.”22	  For	   Huntington,	   unless	   economic	  development	  consolidated	  new	  democracies,	  a	  reverse	  authoritarian	  wave	  was	  likely;23	  and,	  as	  Petras	  and	  Veltmeyer24	  argued,	  globalization	  often	  generated	  some	  hybrid	  form	  of	   “electoral”	   or	   neo-­‐authoritarianism.”	   In	   short,	   while	   the	   global	   hegemony	   of	  Westcentric	   international	   financial	   capital	   has	   reconstituted	   massive	   economic	  inequality	  on	  a	  global	  scale,	  it	  simultaneously	  the	  core	  exports	  the	  formal	  procedures	  of	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democracy	   (elections,	   independent	   judiciaries)	   emptying	   it	   of	   its	   substance—political	  equality.	  	   Second,	   the	   diffusionist	   narrative	   obscures	   the	   fact	   that	   democratization	   is	   a	  
power	  struggle,	   and	  hence	  depends	  on	   the	  power	  of	   the	   global	   hegemon,	   backed	  by	   a	  Westcentric	  “collective	  hegemon’	  that	  promotes	  it.	  The	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  US	  hegemon	  is,	  however,	  strongest	   in	  the	  core	  and	  weakest	   in	  the	  periphery	  and	  the	   less	   legitimacy	  it	  enjoys,	   the	   more	   it	   must	   rely	   on	   more	   costly	   hard	   power	   to	   enforce	   democratic	  capitalism.	   As	   Hegemonic	   Stability	   Theory	   acknowledges,	   such	   “liberal	   imperialism”	  makes	  the	  hegemon	  very	  vulnerable	  to	  imperial	  overreach	  which	  damages	  its	  economy	  and	  encourages	  rising	  alternative	  powers	  to	  contest	  its	  hegemony;	  25	  while	  the	  US	  was,	  in	   the	   1990-­‐2002	   period,	   largely	   unconstrained	   by	   such	   countervailing	   power,	  beginning	   with	   the	   highly	   contested	   Iraq	   war,	   other	   powers	   began	   to	   soft-­‐balance	  against	  Washington	  and	  after	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  Iraq	  intervention	  and	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis,	   the	   US	   retreated	   to	   “offshore	   balancing”	   in	   the	   Middle	   East.	   After	   Iraq,	  authoritarian	  regimes	  were	  able	  to	  undermine	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  democracy-­‐promotion	  by	  depicting	  it	  as	  American	  interventionism.	  Also,	  as	  Levitsy	  and	  Way26	  acknowledged,	  Western	   leverage	   was	   diluted	   when	   applied	   to	   larger	   states	   that	   the	  West	   could	   not	  afford	   to	   destabilize	   (e.g.	   Saudi	   Arabia)	   or	   ones	   with	   alternative	   global	   patrons	   (e.g.,	  Iran);	  indeed,	  Brazil,	  Russia,	  India	  and	  China	  (the	  BRICS)	  had	  coalesced	  to	  soft	  balance	  against	  the	  US.	  They	  aimed	  to	  promote	  a	  global	  power	  balance	  supportive	  of	  a	  renewed	  plurality	   of	   global	   norms	   and	   a	   return	   to	   the	   primacy	   of	   state	   sovereignty	   in	  international	  society.	  Democracy	  promotion	  had	  provoked	  a	  backlash	  by	  the	  second	  half	  of	   the	   2000,	   with	   a	   growing	   number	   of	   governments	   expelling	   Western	   NGOs	   and	  prohibiting	   local	   groups	   from	   taking	   foreign	   funds.27	  In	   these	   new	   conditions,	   when	  democratic	   revolts	   took	   place,	   rather	   than	   provoking	   a	   global	   consensus	   against	  authoritarian	  regimes,	  they	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  become	  a	  matter	  of	  international	  power	  contestation,	   with	   pro-­‐democracy	   intervention	   countered	   by	   non-­‐democratic	   or	  neighbouring	   states	   fearful	   of	   the	   demonstration	   effect	   or	   the	   threat	   to	   the	   regional	  power	   balance.28	  Contesting	   sides	   inside	   states	   undergoing	   revolt	   sought	   to	   draw	   in	  outside	  powers	  on	  their	  side,	  further	  destabilizing	  rather	  than	  democratizing	  them.	  	  	   	  Thirdly,	   intervening	   between	   the	   global	   core	   and	   the	   periphery	   states	   is,	   as	  Buzan	   and	   Wæver29	  argue,	   the	   level	   of	   regions,	   which	   have	   their	   own	   structures—norms,	  power	  balances,	  patterns	  of	  amity-­‐enmity-­‐-­‐which	  are	  at	  least	  partly	  constituted	  ‘bottom	   upward,’	   hence	   reflective	   of	   “thicker”	   regionally	   specific	   variations	   in	   inter-­‐human	  society	   that	  are	  buffers	  against	  global	   influence.	  March	  and	  Olsen	  showed	   that	  path	   dependencies	   from	   historically	   specific	   regional	   experiences	   prevent	   quick	  adaptation	   to	   what	   are	   promoted	   as	   superior	   global	   models,	   with	   a	   typical	   outcome	  
hybridity;	  thus,	  for	  Sharabi	  Western	  penetration	  of	  MENA’s	  patriarchal	  societies	  created	  a	  reinforced	  neo-­‐patriarchal	  order.	  30	  In	  regions	  outside	  the	  Western	  core,	  liberalism,	  far	  from	  a	   triumphant,	  has	   to	   compete	  with	  or	  accommodate	  nationalism	  and	   religion.	   In	  MENA	  it	  encounters	  a	  “grass	  roots	  counter-­‐hegemony”31	  in	  the	  form	  of	  Islam,	  which	  has	  superseded	   socialism	   as	   the	   ideology	   of	   protest	   for	   the	   deprived.	   Islamists	   created	  patriarchal	  versions	  of	  civil	  society	  activism	  that	  could	  provide	  the	  social	  basis	  of	  semi-­‐democratic	  regimes	  in	  which	  popular	  sovereignty	  would	  be	  checked	  by	  the	  “sovereignty	  of	  God”	  (the	  ulama	  interpreting	  the	  sharia).	  The	  socializing	  effect	  of	  “linkage”	  would	  be	  also	   be	  much	   diluted	  where	   substantial	   cultural	   differences	   overlapped	  with	   political	  economy	  factors:	  thus,	  the	  reinforcement	  of	  tribal	  culture	  by	  oil	  rent-­‐funded	  clientelism	  in	   the	   Gulf	   short-­‐circuits	   the	   linkage	   posited	   by	   modernization	   and	   democratization	  theory	  between	  increased	  education	  and	  increased	  participatory	  demands.	  Where,	  as	  in	  
	   5	  
the	  Middle	  East,	  no	  (legitimized)	  hegemonic	  order	  has	  been	  established,	  rival	  norms	  will	  be	   promoted	   by	   rival	   agents	   in	   their	   power	   struggles,	   with	   the	   likely	   outcome	  
hybridity.32	  Political	  change	  may	  still	  mean	  movement	  away	  from	  authoritarianism	  but	  toward	   various	   hybrids	   ranging	   from	   low	   intensity	   consociational	   democracy	   as	   in	  Lebanon	  to	  competitive	  authoritarianism	  such	  as	  Iran’s	  theo-­‐democratic	  power	  sharing	  between	  ulama	  and	  elected	  politicians.	  	  	   	  	  
MENA	  under	  neo-­‐liberal	  globalization	  
The	  political	  economy	  of	  MENA:	  between	  authoritarianism	  and	  democratization	  The	   main	   longer-­‐term	   structural	   factor	   shaping	   regime	   formation	   in	   MENA	   is	   its	  distinctive	   political	   economy-­‐-­‐to	   which	   correspond	   state	   institutions	   and	   agents	   with	  ideologies,	   initially	  shaped	  in	  a	   first	  wave	  of	  globalization	  in	  which	  the	  Western	  world	  expanded	  into	  MENA.	  The	  Marxist	  theory	  of	  uneven	  and	  combined	  development	  tells	  us	  that	   late	   developers’	   defensive	   modernization	   leads	   to	   hybrid	   institutions	   mixing	  capitalist	   and	   pre-­‐capitalist	   features.33	  In	   the	   MENA	   case	   where	   the	   modern	   states	  system	   was	   literally	   imposed	   from	   without	   by	   Western	   imperialism	   in	   what	   David	  Fromkin34	  called	  a	  “peace	  to	  end	  all	  peace,”	  and	  in	  violation	  of	  the	  dominant	  identities	  of	  the	  region’s	  peoples,	  artificial	  states	  had	  to	  compete	  with	  powerful	  pre-­‐existing	  sub-­‐	  and	  supra-­‐state	   forces	   for	   the	   loyalties	   of	   their	   populations,	   and	   hence	   suffered	   built-­‐in	  legitimacy	   deficits.	   In	   these	   circumstances,	   formally	   liberal,	   actually	   oligarchic,	  institutions	  that	  Western	  imperialism	  had	  put	  in	  place	  quickly	  collapsed	  and	  Arab	  state	  builders	   gravitated	   toward	   neo-­‐patrimonial	   practices	   that	   combined	   time-­‐honoured	  indigenous	  state-­‐building	  formulas	  (Ibn	  Khaldun’s35	  assabiya	  or	  elite	  solidarity	  built	  on	  primordial	   ties)	   with	   imported	   modern	   bureaucratic	   machinery	   and	   surveillance	  technology.	  In	  parallel,	  at	  the	  level	  of	  political	  economy,	  the	  penetration	  of	  the	  capitalist	  mode	   of	   production	   into	   MENA,	   articulating	   with	   pre-­‐capitalist	   modes,	   produced,	  according	   to	   Ayubi,36	  a	   fluid	   social	   structure	   lacking	   a	   hegemonic	   class	   wherein	   a	  dominant	  state	  filled	  the	  vacuum.	  Populist	  authoritarian	  (PA)	  regimes	  originating	  in	  the	  military	   coups	   of	   petit	   bourgeois	   officers,	   often	   bound	   by	   a	   particular	   communal	  solidarity	   (assabiya),	   seized	   the	   command	   posts	   of	   the	   army	   and	   bureaucracy.	   These	  state	  elites	  balanced	  between	  the	  fragments	  of	  communally	  and	  territorially	  fragmented	  classes	  while	  forging	  populist	  alliances	  against	  the	  old	  oligarchy	  joining	  national	  capital	  and	  workers/peasants,	   incorporated	   thru	   corporatist	   syndicates,	   rather	   than	   pluralist	  civil	  society.	  In	  the	  PA	  Arab	  republics	  that	  emerged	  in	  the	  1950-­‐60s,	  “Bonapartist”	  states	  (prefigured	   in	   Marx’s	   analysis	   of	   Napoleon	   III)	   launched	   “passive”	   revolutions	   “from	  above.”	  While	  demolishing	  the	  class	  power	  of	  the	  old	  oligarchy	  through	  nationalizations	  and	   land	   reform,	   they	   generated	   their	   own	   state	   bourgeoisies	   via	   statist	   import	  substitution	   industrialization;	   and	   balanced	   in	   international	   politics	   between	  communism	  and	  capitalism,	  getting	  aid	  from	  both	  sides.	  This	  formula	  was	  empowered,	  perhaps	   beyond	   its	   shelf	   life,	   by	   the	   exceptional	   availability	   of	   hydrocarbon	   and	  geopolitical	   rent	   in	   the	   region	   after	   the	   mid-­‐1970s,	   which	   enabled	   the	   lubrication	   of	  clientele	  networks,	  the	  clientelization	  of	  “pre-­‐democratic”	  regime-­‐supportive	  tribes	  and	  communal	  minorities,	  and	  also	  a	  populist	  “social	  contract”	  with	  the	  masses.	  Rents	  gave	  the	   state	   considerable	   autonomy	   of	   society	   and	   allowed	   it	   to	   co-­‐opt	   segments	   of	   the	  business	   class,	   a	   context	   hostile	   to	   democratization	   which	   requires	   a	   class	   balance	  between	   the	   state	   and	   bourgeoisie.	   At	   the	   ideological	   level	   both	   governing	   elites	   and	  masses	  were	  illiberal,	  depriving	  the	  small	  secular	  liberal	  middle	  class	  of	  leverage	  while	  authoritarianism	  was	   successfully	   legitimized	   in	   the	   name	   of	   nationalist	   resistance	   to	  imperialism.37	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   The	  exhaustion	  of	  state	  capitalism	  and	  economic	  and	  fiscal	  crisis	   into	  which	  PA	  regimes	   fell	   from	   the	   1980s	   onward	   made	   them	   extremely	   vulnerable	   to	   Western	  international	   financial	   institutions	   (IFIs),	   such	   as	   the	   World	   Bank	   and	   International	  Monetary	  Fund	  (IMF),	  which	  used	  debt	  relief	  to	  force	  them	  into	  “structural	  adjustment.”	  In	   parallel,	   within	   regimes,	   as	   Higgott	   and	   Dodge38	  argued,	   neo-­‐liberalism	   started	  winning	   as	   power	   shifted	   from	   public	   sector	   managers	   to	   finance	   and	   economy	  ministries	   staffed	   by	   Western	   educated	   technocrats	   with	   direct	   connections	   to	  international	   financial	   institutions	   and	   reflecting	   neo-­‐liberal	   ideological	   hegemony	   at	  the	   global	   level.	   But	   as	  Guazzoni	   and	  Poppi39	  showed,	   economic	   liberalization	   did	   not	  lead	   to	   diminishing	   state	   control	   or	   a	  more	   independent	   civil	   society	   or	   bourgeoisie;	  rather,	   Presidential	   families	   exploited	   IFI’s	   demands	   for	   privatization	   of	   the	   public	  sector	  to	  seize	  its	  choicest	  elements	  as	  their	  private	  property	  and	  to	  generate	  supportive	  crony	  capitalists	  who	  were	  heavily	  invested	  in	  relations	  with	  the	  West.	  IFIs	  commended	  Tunisia	   and	   Egypt,	  where	   the	   cronies	   of	   Gamal	  Mubarak	   and	   the	   Ben	   Ali	   family	   took	  advantage	  of	   their	  pressures	   for	  privatization	   to	   turn	  public	   sector	  assets	   into	  private	  monopolies,	  as	  models	  of	  good	  economic	  governance.40	  	  
	   Globalization	   in	   MENA	   was	   not,	   therefore,	   associated	   with	   democratization.	  Rather,	  authoritarian	  power	  persisted	  but	  was	  now	  used,	  not	  to	  attack	  inequalities,	  as	  in	  the	  populist	   period,	   but	   to	   reconstruct	   and	  protect	   the	  new	   inequalities	  unleashed	  by	  the	   region’s	   opening	   (infitah)	   to	   the	   global	   economy.	   Under	   this	   new	   ‘post-­‐populist’	  authoritarianism,	  regimes	  restructured	  their	  social	  bases.	  Thus,	  privatization	  provided	  regime	   elites	   with	   new	   patronage	   resources	   to	   foster	   and	   co-­‐opt	   a	   supportive	   crony	  capitalist	   class. 41 	  This	   new	   class	   base	   was,	   contrary	   to	   globalization	   discourse,	  incompatible	   with	   democratization:	   crony	   capitalists	   would	   be	   threatened	   by	  democratic	   transparency	   but	   also	   even	   productive	   capitalists	   wanted	   rule	   of	   law	   for	  themselves	  but	  not	  rights	  for	  workers.	  Rather	  than	  a	  hegemonic	  bourgeoisie	  capturing	  the	  state	  and	   instituting	   limited	  democracy	   for	   itself,	  much	  of	   the	  bourgeoisie	  became	  dependent	  on	  the	  state	  for	  contracts,	  business	  opportunities,	  rent	  and	  the	  disciplining	  of	  labour,	   allowing	   rulers	   to	   play	   off	   rival	   business	   cliques.	   While	   capitalism	   is	   said	   to	  empower	  bourgeoisies	  and	  working	  classes	  who	  combine	   to	   force	  democratization,	   in	  MENA	  economic	  liberalization	  and	  privatization	  obstructed	  such	  a	  democratic	  coalition	  and	   was	   used	   to	   build	   anti-­‐democratic	   coalitions—“networks	   of	   privilege” 42 -­‐-­‐re-­‐empowering	  authoritarianism.	  	  	  	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   reviving	   capitalism	  meant	   investors	  had	   to	  be	   favoured	  over	  the	   mass	   public	   through	   reduction	   of	   labour	   rights	   and	   wages	   while	   IMF	   structural	  adjustments	  contracted	  populist	  welfare,	  producing	  ‘food	  riots’	  across	  the	  region	  (while	  leaving	   intact	  military	  purchases	   from	  Western	  arms	  dealers);	  enforcing	   this	   required	  the	   old	   popular	   constituencies	   be	   demobilised;	   hence	   democratization,	   which	   could	  empower	  them	  to	  resist	  neo-­‐liberalism,	  could	  not	  be	  promoted.	  Moreover,	  rollbacks	  of	  the	   populist	   social	   contract	   on	   which	   regimes	   had	   initially	   built	   their	   legitimacy	   and	  abdication	  of	  their	  developmental	  and	  welfare	  roles	  to	  the	  private	  sector	  and	  religious	  charity	   networks	   made	   regimes	   vulnerable	   to	   the	   rise	   of	   Islamic	   opposition,	   that	  powerfully	  attracted	  the	  marginalised	  strata	  victimised	  by	  neo-­‐liberal	  policies	  and	  were	  well	  poised	  to	  win	  elections,	  should	  they	  be	  liberalized.	  Rulers,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  could	  hardly	  expect	  to	  win	  a	  democratic	  election	  when	  they	  were	  forcing	  austerity	  unequally	  on	  the	  majority	  and	  violating	  people’s	  sense	  of	  moral	  economy,	  excluding,	  not	  including	  them,	  as	  the	  populist	  regimes	  had	  initially	  done.	  Contrary	  to	  mainstream	  globalization	  discourse,	  neo-­‐liberalism,	  reinforcing	  rather	  than	  diluting	  regional	  neo-­‐patrimonialism,	  posed	  a	  major	  obstacle	  to	  democratization.	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   As	   such,	   globalization	   was	   paralleled	   by	   a	   move	   toward	   hybrid	   regimes	   via	  ‘lopsided	  political	  liberalization,’	  in	  which	  greater	  access	  was	  accorded	  the	  beneficiaries	  of	  post-­‐populism:	  the	  interest	  groups	  of	  the	  bourgeoisie	  were	  given	  greater	  corporatist	  and	  parliamentary	  access	  to	  power	  and	  more	  rule	  of	  law.	  Elections	  were	  manipulated	  to	  empower	  bourgeois	  parties	  supportive	  of	  neo-­‐liberalism	  and	  marginalise	  populist	  ones,	  with	   safety	   valve	   opposition	   parties	   for	   the	   middle	   class	   tolerated	   only	   within	   strict	  limits;	   and	   corporatist	   arrangements,	   which	   in	   the	   populist	   era	   had	   allowed	   mass	  organizations	   access	   to	   decision-­‐makers,	   becoming	   instruments	   for	   disciplining	   and	  demobilizing	  mass	  strata.43	  It	  was	  against	  this	   ‘post-­‐populist	  authoritarianism’	  that	  the	  Arab	  intifada	  of	  2011	  mobilised.	  	   	  	  	   Authoritarian	  persistence	  was	  reinforced	  by	   the	  role	  of	   the	  region	   in	   the	  world	  system.	  Democracy	  develops	  when	  governments	  need	  their	  citizenry	  to	  pay	  taxes	  or	  to	  fight	  in	  wars	  but	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  many	  states	  depended	  on	  the	  outside-­‐-­‐on	  rents	  (oil	  revenues	   or	   foreign	   aid)	   in	   lieu	   of	   taxes	   and	   on	   foreign	   bases	   and	   security	   treaties	  instead	   of	   citizen	   armies.	   Democracy	   achieves	   hegemony	   when	   associated	   with	  nationalism,	   as	   in	   the	   French	   and	   American	   revolutions;	   but	  MENA	   regimes	   forfeited	  nationalist	   legitimacy	  through	  their	  alignment	  with	  the	  US,	  which	  was,	  with	  Israel,	   the	  most	   unpopular	   state	   in	   Middle	   East	   public	   opinion.44	  Thus,	   where	   democratisation	  even	   partly	   proceeded	   in	  MENA,	   it	   unleashed	   anti-­‐Western	   or	   anti-­‐Israeli	   sentiments	  that	  challenged	  regimes’	  Western-­‐aligned	  foreign	  policies	  and	  which	  Islamic	  movements	  exploited,	  prompting	  a	  halt	  or	  reversal	  of	  these	  experiments.	  The	  case	  of	  Jordan	  shows	  most	  dramatically	  how	  a	  regime's	  responsiveness	  to	  Western	  demands—for	  peace	  with	  an	   Israel	   unwilling	   to	   concede	   Palestinian	   rights-­‐-­‐was	   necessarily	   paralleled	   by	   a	  contraction	  of	  domestic	  democratisation.	  Conversely,	  the	  ‘war	  on	  terror’	  cemented	  new	  political	  alliances	  between	  the	  US,	  Britain	  and	  France	  and	  MENA	  authoritarian	  regimes	  against	   the	   common	   threat	   from	   radical	   Islam.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   authoritarian	  upgrading	  took	  advantage	  of	  a	  certain	  authoritarian	  solidarity	  (e.g.	  Russian	  or	  Chinese	  support)	   and	   in	   some	   cases	   also	   the	   use	   of	   anti-­‐Western	   nationalism	   to	   discredit	  democracy	   discourses.	   Both	   threats	   from	   the	   West	   and	   from	   Islamists	   were	   used	   to	  securitize	  politics.	  	  	  
Western	  democracy	  promotion	  in	  MENA	  During	  the	  first	  decade	  of	  Western	  democracy	  promotion,	  MENA	  was	  largely	  exempted,	  with	  security	  and	  stability	  of	  allied	  regimes	  given	  priority	  over	  democratization.	  In	  the	  1990	   Gulf	   war	   the	   US	   punished	   Jordan	   and	   Yemen	   for	   following	   public	   opinion	   and	  rewarded	   Mubarak	   for	   ignoring	   it.	   Washington’s	   post-­‐war	   presence	   in	   the	   Gulf	  depended	   on	   absolute	   monarchies	   and	   it	   even	   expressed	   alarm	   that	   Yemen’s	  democratization	  would	  infect	  Saudi	  Arabia.	  The	  war	  on	  terror	  aligned	  Washington	  with	  authoritarian	   regimes	   against	   Islamic	   opinion:	   the	   US	   backed	   the	   Algerian	   military’s	  overturning	  of	  an	  Islamist	  electoral	  victory	  and	  its	  violent	  suppression	  of	  Islamists	  while	  US	  NGOs	   praised	   Algeria’s	   1997	   elections	   that	   excluded	   Islamists.	   The	   biggest	   US	   aid	  recipients,	  Egypt	  and	  Jordan,	  did	  not	  hold	  free	  elections.45	  Ray	  Takeyh	  attributes	  this	  to	  the	   fear	   Islamists	  would	   benefit	   from	  democratization	   and	   from	   the	   need	   for	   partner	  regimes	   willing	   to	   deal	   with	   Israel,	   help	   in	   the	   “war	   on	   terror”	   and	   deliver	   oil.46	  In	  parallel,	   Amaney	   Jamal	   sees	   the	   Arab	   bourgeoisie	   embracing	   authoritarianism	   and	  alliance	  with	  the	  US	  as	  a	  bulwark	  against	  Islamists	  and	  popular	  power.	  47	  	   Much	  more	  proactive	  in	  MENA	  was	  the	  European	  Union	  (EU)	  which,	  through	  the	  Mediterranean	  Partnership,	  acted	  collectively	  vis-­‐a-­‐vis	  the	  fragmented	  MENA	  states	  in	  a	  systematic	   drive	   to	   pry	   open	   regional	   markets	   for	   European	   businesses.	   The	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partnership,	   in	   ending	   protection	   for	   industries	   in	   the	   southern	  Mediterranean	  while	  only	  marginally	  expanding	  access	  to	  European	  markets	  for	  MENA	  agricultural	  products,	  reversed	   the	   advantages	   given	   LDCs	   under	   Cold	   War	   preferential	   trading	  arrangements.48	  	   Hyde-­‐Price49	  argues	   that	   the	   EU	   promoted	   market	   opening	   while	  neglecting	   democratization	   and	   human	   rights.	   EU	   defenders	   claimed	   the	   economic	  development	  that	  the	  partnership	  supposedly	  promoted	  would	  lead	  to	  democratization	  over	   the	   long	   run	   and	   that	   EU	   officials	   encouraged	   incremental	   political	   progress	  through	   dialogue	   and	   economic	   incentives	   rather	   than	   antagonizing	   regimes	   with	  predictably	  ineffective	  political	  demands.	  This	  strategy	  would,	  however	  only	  be	  effective	  if	   neo-­‐liberalism	  did	   lead	   to	   economic	   development;	   however,	   as	   Joffe50	  	   observed,	   no	  economy	  has	  ever	  developed	  under	  the	  economic	  openness	  the	  EMP	  mandated;	  rather	  authoritarian	   regimes	   were	   needed	   to	   implement	   free	   trade	   agreements	   that	  pauperized	  MENA	  populations.51	  	  	   The	   Bush	   administration	   announced	   an	   end	   to	   tolerance	   of	   authoritarianism	  after	  9/11	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	   it	  was	  the	  root	  cause	  of	   terrorism,	  hence	  that	  Western	  security	   required	   democratization.	   Washington	   launched	   new	   democracy	   promotion	  campaigns	  without	   consulting	  pro-­‐US	   regimes,	   as	   if,	   declared	  Egypt’s	  Mubarak,	  MENA	  states	  had	  no	  sovereignty.52	  Coming	  in	  parallel	  with	  the	  war	  on	  Iraq	  and	  a	  sharp	  US	  tilt	  toward	  Israel,	  the	  initiative	  triggered	  a	  string	  negative	  reaction	  by	  Arab	  commentators	  and	   journalists,	   congruent	   with	   public	   opinion,	   among	   whom	   it	   was	   seen	   as	   serving	  Israel’s	   interests	   by	   debilitating	   Iraq	   and	   a	   means	   of	   pressuring	   regimes	   to	   be	   more	  cooperative	   on	   Palestine	   and	   Iraq’s	   occupation.	   The	   US	   calls	   for	   human	   rights	   while	  ignoring	   Palestinian	   rights	   had	   no	   credibility;	   also	   the	   Gulf	   oil	   regimes	   were	   always	  exempted.	   Many	   intellectuals	   and	   civil	   society	   groups	   were	   pulled	   between	   their	  nationalist	  rejection	  of	  Western	   interference	  and	  fear	  that	  democracy	  would	  not	  come	  without	  some	  outside	  pressure;	  in	  Egypt	  Western	  pressures	  opened	  limited	  space	  that	  allowed	  the	  strongly	  anti-­‐Mubarak	  Kefiya	  movement	  to	  emerge.	  The	  technical	  approach	  of	   the	  West,	   notably	   the	   stress	   on	   elections	   and	   on	   fostering	   civil	   society	  was	  widely	  criticized;	  and,	  despite	   the	  emphasis	  on	  elections,	  when	  Hamas	  won	  a	   free	  election	   in	  Palestine,	  the	  West	  refused	  to	  recognize	  or	  deal	  with	  it	  and	  the	  fear	  of	  Islamist	  victories	  eased	  the	  pressure	  on	  regimes	  for	  elections.53	  Lynch54	  argued	  that	  US	  support	  for	  Israel	  and	   antagonism	   to	   Iran	   so	   alienated	   regional	   publics	   that	   US	   regional	   influence	  depended	   on	  marginalization	   of	   publics	   by	   authoritarian	   regimes;	   it	   was	   no	   surprise	  that	  Bush	  soon	  abandoned	  democracy	  promotion.	  	  	   The	  Western	  export	  of	  democracy	  to	  the	  region	  was	  widely	  seen	  to	  fail,	  indeed,	  to	  deter	   democratization	   in	   spite	   of	   the	   considerable	   leverage	   and	   a	   reasonable	   level	   of	  linkage.	  It	  was	  seen	  as	  an	  instrument	  of	  US	  hegemony;	  as	  Teti	  55	  argued,	  it	  put	  the	  West	  in	  a	  privileged	  position	  to	  judge	  governance	  in	  MENA	  states	  and	  the	  West’s	  insistence	  on	  secular	   liberal	   versions	   of	   democracy	   combined	   with	   neo-­‐liberal	   economics,	   while	  marginalizing	  Islamic	  versions	  of	  democracy	  and	  discouraging	  redistributive	  measures,	  had	   limited	   appeal	   in	  MENA.	   The	   democratization	   promoted	   by	   the	  West	   was	   of	   the	  “thin”	  variety	  compatible	  with	  neo-­‐liberal	  globalization.	  While	  as	  an	  ideology	  democracy	  made	  gains	   in	  the	  region,	   it	   faced	  too	  much	  competition	  from	  counter	   ideologies	  to	  be	  hegemonic,	  and	  the	  balance	  of	  social	  forces	  produced	  by	  the	  articulation	  of	  global	  neo-­‐liberalism	  with	  MENA	  crony	  capitalism	  was	  most	  compatible	  with	  hybrid	  regimes	  and	  at	  best	  with	  ‘low	  intensity”	  democracy	  (Tunisia,	  Lebanon).	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The	  Uprising:	  democratization	  between	  structure	  and	  agency	  
Global	  level	  Precipitants	  Global	   level	   pressures	   played	   a	   key	   role	   in	   destabilizing	   the	   fragile	   post-­‐populist	  authoritarian	  regimes	  in	  MENA.	  While	  the	  globalization	  of	  neo-­‐liberalism	  reduced	  their	  ability	  to	  satisfy	  the	  welfare	  of	  mass	  publics,	  the	  parallel	  promotion	  of	  democratization	  and	  the	  spread	  of	  Internet	  technology	  encouraged	  anti-­‐regime	  political	  mobilization	  by	  middle	   class	   youth	   “overproduced”	   by	   population	   growth	   and	   educational	   expansion.	  Activists	  trained	  by	  US	  government	  funded	  democracy	  promotion	  campaigns	  and	  West	  European	  NGOs	  played	  a	  certain	  role	  in	  spreading	  the	  Uprising.56	  The	  “responsibility	  to	  protect,”	   doctrine	   conveyed	   the	  misapprehension	   to	   dissident	   activists	   that	   the	  West	  would	   intervene	   should	   repression	   exceed	   certain	   limits.	   The	  US	   invasion	  of	   Iraq	  had	  also	  empowered	  sectarian	  discourses	  that	  spread	  outward	  across	  the	  region,	  reinforced	  by	  Saudi-­‐Iranian	  rivalry;	  the	  nominally	  consociational	  democracy	  left	  behind	  by	  the	  US	  in	   Iraq,	   with	   its	   built-­‐in	   Shia	  majority,	   was	   actually	   a	   failed	   state	   that	  would	   provide	  fertile	  ground	  for	  the	  anti-­‐democratic	  ISIS	  movement.	  	  	   	  The	   Uprisings	   provided	   a	   new	   context	   for	   competitive	   interference	   by	   global	  powers	  that	  blocked	  any	  straightforward	  export	  of	  democracy.	  The	  US	  was	  ambivalent	  about	   the	   Uprisings,	   which	   constituted	   a	   threat	   to	   key	   allies,	   notably	   Egypt,	   where	  Mubarak	  was	  deposed	  and	  Saudi	  Arabia,	  which	  was	  threatened	  by	  insurgents	  in	  Yemen	  and	  protests	  in	  Bahrain.	  But	  the	  West	  also	  saw	  opportunities	  to	  reincorporate	  Libya	  and	  Syria	   into	   the	   Westcentric	   democratic	   capitalist	   order	   and	   to	   roll	   back	   the	   growing	  regional	  influence	  of	  Russia	  and	  China,	  which	  had	  growing	  stakes	  in	  arms	  deals,	  energy	  partnerships,	   and	   trade	   with	   authoritarian	   regimes.	   What	   was	   remarkable	   was	   that	  while	  Western	  democracy	  promotion	  was,	   for	  once,	   in	   sync	  with	   social	  movements	   in	  the	  region,	  the	  outcome	  was	  no	  straightforward	  expansion	  of	  the	  democratic-­‐capitalist	  world.	   The	   West’s	   abuse	   of	   the	   United	   Nations	   resolution	   authorizing	   humanitarian	  intervention	   in	   Libya	   to	   effect	   regime	   change	   activated	   Russia	   and	   China’s	   strong	  interest	   in	   defending	   the	  norm	  of	   sovereignty	   against	  Western	   expansion	   in	  MENA	  at	  the	   expense	   of	   the	   multi-­‐polar	   world	   order	   they	   sought,57	  which	   was	   also	   congruent	  with	   the	   interests	  of	  anti-­‐Western	  MENA	  regimes	  and	  movements.	  Also,	  with	   regional	  turmoil	   not	   lending	   itself	   to	   management	   by	   military	   means	   and	   chastened	   by	   its	  adventure	   in	   Iraq	   and	   lingering	   austerity	   from	   the	  world	   financial	   crisis,	  Washington	  retreated	  to	  its	  traditional	  “off	  shore	  balancing”	  in	  MENA,	  content	  to	  contain	  and	  exploit	  regional	   cleavages,	   notably	   the	   Sunni-­‐Shia	   conflict	   most	   manifest	   in	   Syria	   and	   Iraq	  where	  anti-­‐Western	  Shia	  and	  Sunni	  movements	  were	  fighting	  each	  other.	  	  	  
The	  Regional	  Trans-­‐state	  level:	  the	  construction	  and	  de-­‐construction	  of	  democratic	  
ideological	  hegemony	  The	   first	   regional	   manifestation	   of	   the	   Uprising	   was	   the	   unleashing	   of	   a	   trans-­‐state	  ideological	   struggle.	   The	   Uprisings	   were	   accompanied	   by	   a	   powerful	   mobilization	   of	  pro-­‐democracy	   sentiment	   in	   the	   region,	   parallel	   to	   the	   weakening	   and	   collapse	   of	  several	   authoritarian	   states.	   What	   was	   remarkable	   was	   that	   while	   Bush’s	   forced	  democratization,	  unleashing	  civil	  war	   in	  Iraq	  and	  Lebanon,	  had	  seemingly	  discrediting	  the	  notion	  in	  the	  2000s,	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  2011	  youth	  movements	  and	  rebellions	  were	  chiefly	  for	  democracy	  and	  freedom	  in	  their	  own	  states,	  rather	  than	  the	  traditional	  Pan-­‐Arab,	   anti-­‐imperialist,	   concerns	   that	   had	   dominated	   the	   2000-­‐2010	   “New	   Arab	   Cold	  War.”58	  Even	  more	   remarkable	   was	   that	   significant	   segments	   of	   regional	   opinion	   put	  aside	   their	   traditional	  suspicion	  of	  Western	   interference	   to	  call	   for	   intervention	  under	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the	   banner	   of	   responsibility	   to	   protect	   and	   against	   the	   heavy	   repression	   deployed	   by	  regimes	  in	  Libya	  and	  Syria	  in	  particular.	  	  	   In	  parallel	  to	  democratization	  discourses,	  the	  uprisings	  also	  empowered	  Islamic	  identity.	   The	   main	   initial	   beneficiary	   was	   the	   Muslim	   Brotherhood	   whose	   electoral	  prowess,	   backed	   by	   Turkey	   and	   Qatari	  money	   and	  media,	   propelled	   its	   simultaneous	  rise	  toward	  the	  levers	  of	  power	  in	  several	  states,	  seemingly	  on	  the	  brink	  of	  realizing	  its	  moderate	   Islamic	  version	  of	  democracy;	  had	   it	  prevailed,	   the	   third	  wave	  might	   finally	  have	  penetrated	  the	  Arab	  world.	  With	  variants	  from	  the	  Ikhwan	  tradition	  ruling	  in	  the	  pivotal	   capitals	   of	   Ankara	   and	   Cairo,	   and	   kindred	   movements	   empowered	   or	   in	  government	   in	   Tunisia,	   Morocco,	   Yemen,	   Palestinian	   Gaza,	   and	   Libya,	   a	   new	   Islamic	  version	   of	   democracy	   that	   eschewed	   the	   anti-­‐democratic	   and	   sectarian	   exclusionary	  Wahhabi	  version,	  seemed	  on	  the	  cusp	  of	  achieving	  hegemony.	  Other	  Islamists,	  such	  as	  the	   formerly	   anti-­‐democratic	   Salafis,	   joined	   the	   democratic	   political	   game	   while	   al-­‐Qaida’s	  was	  marginalized	  by	   the	  peaceful	   overthrows	  of	  dictators,	   especially	  when	   its	  new	   leader	  Ayman	  Al-­‐Zawahiri,	   denounced	   the	   principle	   of	  majority	   rule,	   defying	   the	  yearning	  of	  Muslim	  populations	  for	  democracy.	  	  	   However,	   in	   parallel,	   Saudi	   Arabia	   fostered	   conservative	   Salafis	   in	   Egypt	   and	  Syria	  against	  both	  secular	  democratic	  youth	  and	  the	  Brotherhood	  and	  also	  used	  Sunni	  Salafism	  against	  Iran	  as	  part	  of	   their	  geo-­‐political	  struggle;	  combined	  with	  the	  parallel	  use	  of	  non-­‐Sunni	  sectarian	  solidarity	  by	   the	  Syrian	  and	  Bahraini	   regimes	  against	   their	  uprisings,	  sectarian	  conflicts	  soon	  spread	  insecurity	  and	  defensive	  sectarian	  solidarity	  in	  Lebanon,	   Syria,	   Bahrain,	   Yemen	   and	   Iraq,	   which	   would	   make	   democratization	  impossible.	   In	   parallel,	   the	   ailing	   fortunes	   of	   Al-­‐Qaida	   and	   its	   various	   avatars	   was	  reversed,	  thriving	  on	  sectarian	  polarization	  and	  new	  opportunities	   in	  the	  failing	  states	  of	   Libya,	   Yemen,	   Syria	   and	   Iraq.	   Moreover,	   by	   the	   third	   year	   of	   the	   uprisings,	   state	  national	   security	   establishments	   were	   recovering	   some	   of	   their	   lost	   capacity	   in	   a	  fightback,	  notably	  in	  Egypt	  and	  Syria,	  against	  both	  democratization	  and	  Islamization.	  A	  watershed	   was	   the	   overthrow	   of	   President	   Morsi	   in	   Egypt	   by	   an	   alliance	   between	  secularist	  liberals	  and	  the	  army	  and	  deep	  state.	  It	  was	  encouraged	  by	  a	  tacit	  alliance	  of	  Israel,	   which	   covered	   the	   military’s	   flank	   in	   Washington,	   with	   Saudi	   Arabia,	   which	  provided	   copious	   financial	   support	   and	   brought	   Egypt’s	   Salafis	   into	   the	   new	  military	  dominated	   ruling	   coalition.	  This	  marked	  a	   triumph	  of	   counter-­‐revolutionary	  and	  anti-­‐democratic	  forces	  regionally.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	   liberals	  began	  to	  abandon	  a	  democracy	  that	  would	  empower	  Islamists;	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  the	  trend	  toward	  democratization	  of	  Islamic	   movements	   was	   reversed	   by	   the	   demonstration	   in	   Egypt	   that	   Islamic	  movements	  that	  won	  elections	  would	  not	  be	  allowed	  to	  rule.	  The	  absolute	  monarchies,	  Saudi	   and	   UAE	   especially,	   which	   had	   encouraged	   the	   military,	   along	   with	   their	  polarizing	   sectarian	   Sunni	   discourse,	   were	   empowered	   and	   the	   democratic	   Islamic	  threat	  to	  them	  diluted.	  Far	  from	  the	  democratic	  mobilization	  leading	  to	  the	  hegemony	  of	  democratic	  norms,	  it	  had	  unleashed	  normative	  fragmentation.	  	  	  
Competitive	  Interference	  amidst	  the	  regional	  struggle	  for	  power	  	  At	   the	   regional	   level	   the	  Uprising	   intensified	   the	   pre-­‐existing	   regional	   power	   struggle	  between	  the	  Iran-­‐led	  “resistance	  axis”	  and	  the	  Sunni-­‐dominated	  pro-­‐Western	  axis	  led	  by	  Saudi	   Arabia.	   Three	   regional	   powers,	   Saudi	   Arabia,	   Iran	   and	   Turkey,	   with	   enough	  material	  and	  soft	  power	  and	  sufficient	  invulnerability	  to	  the	  Uprising	  to	  try	  to	  use	  it	  to	  bid	   for	   regional	   hegemony	   in	   the	   name	   of	   quite	   different	  models	   of	   governance,	  with	  only	   Turkey	   ostensibly	   promoting	   democratization.	   This	   precipitated	   the	   inter-­‐state	  power	  balancing	  which	   realism	  expects	  will	   block	   bids	   for	   hegemony:	   as	   a	   result,	   the	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region	   was	   fragmented	   as	   no	   power	   managed	   to	   use	   the	   Uprising	   to	   shape	   a	   new	  regional	  order	  under	  its	  hegemony.	  	  	  
Saudi	  Arabia	  (and	  the	  Gulf	  Cooperation	  Council):	  A	  new	  “Holy	  Alliance”:	  	  The	  Uprising	  initially	  appeared	  a	  major	  threat	  to	  the	  monarchies.	  The	  loss	  of	  Mubarak’s	  Egypt,	  state	  failure	  in	  Yemen,	  where	  they	  and	  Iran	  backed	  opposing	  sides	  in	  the	  Houthi	  rebellion	  in	  the	  north,	  and	  al-­‐Qaida	  was	  also	  finding	  space	  to	  operate;	  and	  the	  possibly-­‐contagious	   Shia	  uprising	   in	  Bahrain	  were	  perceived	   as	  opportunities	   for	   Iran.	  But	   the	  monarchies	   dampened	   the	   potential	   spread	   of	   revolt	   to	   their	   own	   populations	   via	   a	  combination	  of	  repression,	  most	  obvious	  in	  Bahrain;	  political	  concession,	  most	  obvious	  in	   Morocco,	   and	   economic	   blandishments	   to	   citizens,	   most	   obvious	   in	   Saudi	   Arabia	  where	  $5,000/citizen	  worth	  of	  jobs	  and	  benefits	  were	  promised.59	  The	  Gulf	  Cooperation	  Council	   (GCC)	   was	   ungraded	   into	   a	   counter-­‐revolutionary	   “Holy	   Alliance,”	   de	   facto	  incorporating	   Morocco	   and	   Jordan,	   with	   the	   rich	   GCC	   states	   transferring	   billions	   of	  dollars	   to	   the	   poorer	   monarchies	   to	   enable	   them	   to	   similarly	   appease	   discontent,	  crowned	   by	   anti-­‐revolutionary	   intervention	   in	   Bahrain.	   Certainly,	   their	   financial	  liquidity	   glut	   allowed	   them	   to	   fund	   trans-­‐state	   Islamists	   against	   secularists	   and	   buy	  influence	  on	  a	  massive	  scale	  in	  Uprising	  states,	  particularly	  Egypt.60	  	  The	  GCC	  also	  went	  on	  the	  offensive,	  taking	  advantage	  of	  its	  media	  dominance	  and	  its	  bloc	  vote	  in	  the	  Arab	  League	   to	   legitimize	   the	  Western	   intervention	   against	   old	   foes	   Qaddafi	   and	   Asad.	   Al-­‐Jazeera	  was	  overtly	  political,	  exaggerating	  and	  widely	  disseminating	  regime	  violence	  in	  Syria	   while	   ignoring	   repression	   in	   Bahrain	   and	   instances	   of	   violence	   by	   the	   Syrian	  opposition.	  However,	   splits	   between	  Riyadh	   and	  Doha	   over	   their	   sponsorship	   of	   rival	  (Muslim	  Brotherhood,	  Salafi)	   Islamists	  put	   the	  GCC	  at	  cross-­‐purposes:	   the	   two	  backed	  rival	  Islamists	  in	  Egypt	  and	  in	  also	  in	  Syria	  where	  Gulf-­‐funded	  Islamists	  fought	  both	  the	  regime	  and	  each	  other,	  helping	  to	  produce	  a	  failed	  state.	  In	  inflaming	  Islamist	  militancy	  and	  anti-­‐Shia	  sentiment,	   the	  GCC	  helped	  empower	  al-­‐Qaida	  avatars	  such	  as	   ISIS.	  Saudi	  Arabia’s	  backing	  for	  the	  military	   in	  Egypt	  against	  Turkish	  and	  Qatari	  promotion	  of	  the	  Muslim	   Brotherhood	   helped	   precipitate	   an	   internal	   conflict	   that	   ended	   in	   a	   hybrid	  regime	  in	  Cairo.	  	  	   	  
Turkey:	  failed	  liberal	  hegemon:	  	  The	  rise	  of	  the	  Adalet	  ve	  Kalkınma	  Partisi	   (AKP)	  government	  to	  power	  in	  2000	  initiated	  a	   transformation	   in	  Turkey’s	  Middle	   East	   policy.	   Its	   policy	   of	   ‘zero	   problems’	  with	   its	  neighbours,	  aimed	   to	  ameliorate	   the	   interminable	   regional	   conflicts	   left	  behind	  by	   the	  fall	   of	   the	  Ottoman	  empire	  by	   exporting	   the	   liberal	   practices	  of	   the	   zone	  of	  peace.	  An	  active	   diplomacy	   sought	   to	   resolve	   disputes,	   project	   Turkey	   as	   a	   model	   of	   an	  economically	  successful	  Islamic	  democracy,	  and	  appeal	  to	  an	  Islamic	  civilization	  shared	  by	  Turks	  and	  Arabs.	  Economic	  integration	  aimed	  to	  construct	  new	  cross-­‐border	  “liberal”	  interdependencies	   that	   would	   also	   permit	   the	   export	   of	   Turkish	   business	   in	   need	   of	  regional	  markets.	  61	  	  	   The	   Arab	   Uprising	   initially	   upset	   Turkey’s	   strategy,	   which	   had	   prioritized	  economic	   integration	   with	   its	   Arab	   neighbourhood	   regardless	   of	   their	   authoritarian	  governance.	  Turkey	  initially	  opposed	  North	  Atlantic	  Treaty	  Organization	  intervention	  in	  Libya	  where	  it	  had	  close	  business	  ties	  with	  the	  regime.	  But	  the	  then	  prime	  minister,	  now	  president,	   Recep	   Tayyip	   Erdoğan	   switched	   his	   discourse	   to	   the	   championing	   of	  democratization	  as	  the	  region-­‐wide	  rise	  of	  kindred	  business/Islamist	  coalitions	  similar	  to	   the	   AKP	   in	   the	   apparently-­‐emerging	   Sunni	   democracies	   in	   Tunisia	   and	   Egypt	  provided	  new	  openings	   to	  Turkish	   soft	  power.	  The	  congruity	  of	   its	  political	   system-­‐-­‐a	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democracy	   that	   incorporates	   Islamic	   forces-­‐-­‐with	   regional	   popular	   aspirations,	   was	  demonstrated	   by	   the	   hero’s	   welcome	   given	   Erdoğan	   in	   his	   2011	   tour	   of	   these	  countries.62	  	  	   It	  was	  in	  Syria	  that	  Turkish	  policy	  ran	  aground.	  Syria	  had	  been	  the	  showcase	  of	  its	   zero-­‐problems	   strategy	   where	   trans-­‐state	   issues	   of	   conflict,	   such	   as	   the	   disputed	  Turkish	  annexation	  of	  Iskanderun,	  Euphrates	  water,	  and	  Kurdish	  separatism,	  had	  been	  resolved	   amidst	   the	   opening	   of	   borders	   to	   free	   passage	   and	   free	   trade	   agreements,	  which	  were	  meant	   to	  be	  extended	   into	   the	  Levant	  and	  Gulf	  areas.	  However,	  when	   the	  Syrian	  Uprising	  started	  and	  Asad	  dismissed	  Turkey’s	  calls	  to	  contain	  it	  through	  political	  reforms	   and	   instead	   continued	   repressing	   protestors,	   the	   AKP	   now	   professed	   to	   see	  repressive	   dictatorships	   as	   the	   most	   serious	   threat	   to	   its	   ambition	   for	   a	   pacific	  neighbourhood	  and	  democracy	  as	  the	  solution.	  It	  sacrificed	  its	  ties	  with	  Asad’s	  regime,	  helped	  organize	  the	  Syrian	  opposition	  and	  gave	  it	  safe	  haven	  to	  operate	  an	  insurgency	  from	  Turkish	   territory.	   If,	   as	  Turkey	   expected,	   the	  minority	  Alawi	   regime	  had	  quickly	  collapsed	  and	  been	  replaced	  by	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  opposition,	  the	  AKP	  could	  have	  expected	   to	   enjoy	   special	   influence	   in	   Damascus.	   However,	   Erdoğan	   had	   grossly	  underestimated	  the	  tenacity	  of	  the	  Asad	  regime,	  bolstered	  by	  its	  allies	  in	  the	  resistance	  axis,	  Iran	  and	  Hizbollah.	  Turkey	  appeared	  impotent	  even	  to	  manage	  the	  spillover	  of	  the	  crisis—refugee	   flows,	   Kurdish	   empowerment—on	   its	   borders.	   Its	   attempt	   to	   export	  democracy	   to	   its	   neighbour	   had	   the	   same	   outcome	   as	   the	   earlier	   US	   attempt	   in	   Iraq:	  collapse	  into	  a	  failed	  state.	  In	  calling	  on	  the	  West	  to	  intervene	  in	  Syria,	  Ankara	  jettisoned	  its	  earlier	  notion	  of	  a	  Middle	  East	  zone	  of	  peace	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  misguided	  American	  interventions.	   In	  deploying	  Sunni	   Islamic	   identity	   against	   the	   secular/Alawi	   regime	   in	  Damascus,	  Ankara	  contributed	  to	  the	  sectarianization	  that	  was	  destabilizing	  the	  region.	  Turkey	  was	  soon	  on	  bad	  terms	  with	  other	  Middle	  East	  states,	  too.	  Over	  Syria	  it	  sacrificed	  its	   good	   relations	   with	   Iran.	   Iraq’s	   Shia-­‐led	   government	   objected	   to	   Ankara’s	  manipulated	   of	   its	   ties	   to	   Iraqi	   Sunnis	   and	   Kurds	   against	   Baghdad.	   When	   Turkey	  objected	  to	   the	  overthrow	  of	  President	  Morsi	  and	  Egyptian	  moves	  to	   isolate	  Hamas	   in	  Gaza,	  ties	  with	  Cairo	  turned	  sour.	  	  	   	  
The	  new	  struggle	  for	  Syria:	  the	  perils	  of	  exporting	  the	  non-­‐violent	  resistance	  paradigm:	  
	  In	  Syria,	  the	  Uprising	  began	  as	  a	  mobilization	  of	  protestors	  demanding	  democratization	  against	  a	  repressive	  authoritarian	  regime,	  arguably	  a	  test	  of	  the	  non-­‐violent	  resistance	  model	   which	   anticipates	   the	   use	   of	   violence	   against	   mass	   non-­‐violent	   protest	   will	  precipitate	   either	   defections	   in	   the	   security	   forces	   or	   external	   sanctions	   and	  intervention.	   Indeed,	   the	   possibility	   of	   external	   military	   intervention	   shaped	   both	  opposition	   and	   regime	   strategies.	   Western	   funded	   Syrian	   expatriates,	   young	  cosmopolitans	  that	  were	  instrumental	   in	   initiating	  and	  internationalizing	  the	  Uprising,	  understood	   that	   they	   could	   not	   succeed	  without	   external	   intervention	   to	   restrain	   the	  regime’s	  repressive	  options.	  External	  activists	  told	  those	  on	  the	  ground,	  pointing	  to	  the	  Libya	  no-­‐fly	  zone,	  that	  “the	  international	  community	  won’t	  sit	  and	  watch	  you	  be	  killed.”	  They	  claimed	  that	  another	  Hama	  was	  not	  possible	  because	  “Everything	  is	  being	  filmed	  on	   YouTube,	   and	   there’s	   a	   lot	   of	   international	   attention	   on	   the	   Middle	   East.”63	  This	  encouraged	  Syrian	  activists	   to	  risk	   their	   lives	  and	  to	  eschew	  the	  compromise	  with	  the	  regime	   needed	   for	   a	   pacted	   transition.	   The	   Libyan	   intervention	   gave	   decisive	  momentum	  to	  the	  uprising.64	  	   The	   regime,	   for	   its	   part,	   having	   survived	   several	   decades	   of	  Western	   isolation,	  had	  always	  seen	  itself	  as	  besieged	  by	  foreign	  enemies;	  the	  role	  played	  by	  external	  exiles	  and	   internet	   activists	   abroad	   in	   provoking	   or	   escalating	   the	   Uprising	   was	   congruent	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with	   its	   perceptions	   of	   conspiracy	   and	   tarnished	   the	   indigenous	   opposition	   with	   the	  suspicion	   of	   treasonous	   dealings	   with	   foreign	   enemies,	   justifying	   the	   resort	   to	  repressive	  violence.	  The	  regime	  tried	   to	  calibrate	   its	  violence	  within	   limits	   that	  would	  not	   trigger	   an	   international	   bandwagon	   toward	   intervention,	   although	   over	   time	   this	  bar	  was	  steadily	  raised.	  Later	  yet,	  it	  felt	  the	  need	  to	  quickly	  smash	  resistance	  so	  as	  not	  to	  lose	   control	   of	   territory	   that	   could	   be	   used	   to	   stage	   intervention	   as	   had	   happened	   in	  Libya,	   thus	   precipitating	   a	   transition	   from	   the	   “security	   solution”	   to	   the	   “military	  solution.”	   This	   did	   not	   precipitate	  Western	   intervention	   for,	   in	   contrast	   to	   Libya,	   the	  consensus	   behind	   humanitarian	   intervention	   had	   been	   destroyed	   by	   Western-­‐led	  regime	  change	  in	  Libya.	  	  	   Repression	  did	  precipitate	  some	  defections	  from	  the	  Syrian	  military,	  not	  enough	  to	  precipitate	  regime	  collapse	  but	  enough	  that	  the	  regime	  lost	  control	  of	  wide	  swathes	  of	   the	   northeast	   of	   the	   country	   to	   armed	   insurgents.	   The	   struggle	   for	   Syria	   became	   a	  regional	  and	  international	  proxy	  war;	  regionally,	  with	  Turkish,	  Saudi	  and	  Qatari	  support	  for	   the	  opposition	  being	  offset	  by	   Iranian,	  Hizbollah	  and	   Iraqi	   support	   for	   the	   regime;	  and	  internationally,	  through	  American	  and	  European	  support	  for	  the	  Uprising	  offset	  by	  Russian	  and	  Chinese	  support	  for	  the	  regime.	  Iran	  proved	  a	  tenacious	  power	  balancer:	  on	  the	  defensive,	  Tehran	  sought	  to	  create	  a	  protective	  land	  belt	  from	  via	  Iraq	  (where	  post-­‐US	   occupation,	   the	   move	   of	   the	   Maliki	   regime	   against	   Sunni	   rivals	   made	   it	   more	  dependent	  on	  Iran)	  to	  Syria,	  and	  Hizbollah.	  These	  external	  involvements,	  each	  blocking	  the	   other,	   contributed	   to	   the	   stalemating	   of	   the	   Syrian	   conflict,	   especially	   as	   the	  insurgents	   began	   to	   fight	   among	   themselves,	   pitting	   more	   moderate	   Syrian	   rebels	  against	  transnational	  al-­‐Qaida	  avatars,	  Jabhat	  al-­‐Nursa	  and	  the	  Islamic	  State	  of	  Iraq	  and	  Syria (ISIS).	  With	  rising	  levels	  of	  jihadist	  involvement,	  the	  West	  became	  more	  concerned	  with	  the	  “international	  war	  on	  terror”	  than	  with	  the	  “Responsibility	  to	  Protect.”	  	  	   	  
Egypt	  and	  Tunisia:	  Neo-­‐Liberalism	  Redux:	  	  Democratic	   uprisings	   do	   not	   guarantee	   democratic	   consolidation:	   the	   two	   regional	  states	  with	   the	   least	   fragmented	   societies	   and	  most	   developed	   institutions,	   hence	   the	  best	   prospects	   for	   democratization,	   faced	   a	   political	   economy	   stacked	   against	  consolidation.	  The	   revolutions	   in	  Egypt	   and	  Tunisia	  were	  a	   reaction	  against	   the	   acute	  social	   inequalities	   resulting	   from	   neo-­‐liberalism,	   but	   the	   revolutions	   remained	   purely	  political,	   with	   no	   attempts	   to	   attack	   unjust	   economic	   inequalities.	   This	   was	   because	  enduring	   dependencies	   on	   the	  Western-­‐centred	   international	   financial	   system	   locked	  them	   into	   neo-­‐liberal	   practices.	   Indeed,	   because	   the	   uprisings	   has	   actually	   worsened	  economic	   growth,	   hence	   prospects	   for	   addressing	   unemployment,	   by	   deterring	  investors	  and	  tourism,	  they	  were	  more	  dependent	  on	  Western	  IFIs.	  Particularly	  in	  Egypt	  IFIs	  tried	  to	  exploit	  the	  post-­‐Uprisings	  economic	  crises	  to	  making	  loans	  conditional	  on	  further	  opening	  to	  international	  finance	  capital,	  notably	  privatizations	  that	  would	  allow	  Western	  and	  Gulf	   investors	  to	  buy	  up	  prime	  parts	  of	  Egypt’s	   infrastructure	  and	  public	  services.	  65	  	  	   In	   this	   context,	   the	   least	   bad	   outcome	  was	   the	   “low	   intensity	   democracy”	   that	  appeared	  possible	  in	  Tunisia	  where	  long-­‐term	  Western	  cultural	  penetration	  may	  indeed	  have	   assist	   democratic	   consolidation-­‐-­‐ironically,	   even	   when	   the	   West	   supports	   the	  authoritarian	   leader,	   as	   was	   the	   case	   with	   Ben	   Ali.	   If	   democracy	   is	   consolidated	   in	  Tunisia,	   it	   will	   be	   because	   moderates	   were	   able	   to	   reach	   a	   pact	   to	   marginalize	   the	  radicals	   on	   both	   sides,	   despite	   the	   French	   supporting	   anti-­‐clericalists	   and	   the	   Gulf	  supporting	   Salafists.	  But	   even	   in	  Tunisia,	   nostalgia	   set	   in	   for	   the	   stability	   and	   relative	  prosperity	  of	  the	  Ben	  Ali	  period;	  all	  that	  had	  changed	  for	  the	  unemployed	  was	  increased	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political	  freedom	  to	  express	  their	  frustrations.	  In	  Egypt,	  where	  political	  competition	  was	  diverted	   from	   economic	   injustice	   to	   identity	   issues	   framed	   in	   de-­‐stabilizing	   zero-­‐sum	  terms	  and	  backed	  by	  competitive	  interference	  from	  the	  US,	  Saudi	  Arabia,	  and	  Qatar,	  the	  result	  was	  a	  hybrid	  regime:	  mixing	  some	  political	  pluralism	  with	  doses	  of	  authoritarian	  power	  needed	  to	  manage	  identity	  conflicts	  and	  turn	  back	  demands	  for	  social	  justice	  that	  could	  not	  be	  accommodated	  in	  a	  global	  neo-­‐liberal	  economic	  order.	  	  	  
Conclusion:	  	  The	  diffusionist	  approach,	  with	  its	  image	  of	  both	  benign	  and	  inevitable	  global	  diffusion	  of	  democratic	  capitalism	  (each	  believed	  to	  reinforce	  the	  other)	  from	  the	  core	  provides	  little	  explanation	   for	   the	   failure	  of	  democratization	   in	  post-­‐Uprising	  MENA,	  except	   the	  notion	  of	  time	  lags,	  perhaps	  attributable	  to	  cultural	  exceptionalism,	  a	  mechanical	  view	  that	  neglects	  agency.	  Neo-­‐Gramscianism	  offers	  a	  far	  more	  robust	  explanation;	  for	  it,	  the	  exportability	  of	  a	  stable	  democratic-­‐capitalist	  world	  order	  to	  the	  periphery	  depends	  on	  congruence	   between	   forces	   of	   production	   and	   hegemonic	   norms.	   However	   the	  contradictions	   within	   the	   Western	   core’s	   version	   of	   world	   order	   debilitated	   its	  exportable	  power.	  	   The	   West	   has	   certainly	   left	   a	   profound	   impact	   on	   MENA	   but	   it	   has	   not	   been	  benign	  and	  has	  therefore	  inevitably	  generated	  resistance.	  In	  a	  first	  wave	  of	  globalization	  the	  West	   imposed	   an	   arbitrary	   and	   flawed	   states	   system	  made	   up	   of	   fragile	   regimes	  wherein	  early	   liberal	   experiments	   rapidly	   failed	  and	  more	   indigenous	  hybrids	  of	  neo-­‐patrimonialism	   and	   populism	   became	   the	   main	   state	   building	   formulas.	   The	   second	  wave	  of	  globalization	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  exposed	  these	  regimes	  to	  the	  powerful	  homogenizing	   material	   forces	   (finance	   capital,	   markets),	   triumphant	   liberal	   ideology	  (via	  transnational	  linkages	  and	  the	  new	  globalized	  communications	  technology)	  and	  the	  dominance	   of	   a	   liberal	   global	   hegemon,	   the	   US,	   which	   increasingly	   penetrated	   the	  region.	   However,	   rather	   than	   these	   reinforcing	   each	   other,	   the	   incongruence	   in	   the	  Western	  project	  prevented	  achievement	  of	  hegemony	  over	  the	  region.	  	  	   The	  core’s	  export	  of	  democracy	  suffered,	  first	  of	  all,	  from	  a	  built-­‐in	  contradiction	  between	  the	  global	  inequality	  generated	  by	  neo-­‐liberalism	  and	  the	  democratic	  norm	  of	  equality.	   The	   US	   hegemon	   cannot	   bridge	   this	   contradiction	   because	   it	   lacks	   both	   the	  hard	   and	   soft	   power	   to	   control	   the	   region	   and	  provokes	   anti-­‐hegemonic	  balancing	  by	  global	   and	   regional	   powers.	   The	   incoherence	  of	   global	   liberalism	   inevitably	   generates	  regional	   backlashes,	   with	   counter-­‐ideologies,	   nationalist	   populism	   and	   Islamism,	  retaining	   remarkable	   power	   in	   MENA,	   with	   the	   latter	   the	   only	   credible	   counter-­‐hegemonic	  ideology	  opposing	  triumphant	  world	  liberalism.	  	   Moreover,	   MENA	   regimes	   have	   proved	   extremely	   resilient	   in	   the	   face	   of	  globalization,	   and	   indeed	   adept	   in	   using	   global	   resources—investment,	   arms,	  technology—to	   adapt.	   In	   the	   oil-­‐poor	   republics,	   regimes,	   such	   as	   the	   Tunisian	   and	  Egyptian	  ones,	   selectively	  exploited	  global	  neo-­‐liberal	  pressures	   to	   reconstitute	  statist	  authoritarian	   regimes	   in	   inegalitarian	   crony	   capitalist	   forms	   quite	   resistant	   to	  democratization.	   In	   parallel,	   the	   Arab	   regimes	   most	   incorporated	   into	   Westcentric	  global	   financial	   networks,	   the	   Arab	   Gulf	   state	   were	   the	   least	   democratic,	   not	   only	  internally,	  but	  also	  in	  their	  use	  of	  finance	  capital	  to	  promote	  anti-­‐democratic	  forces.	  	  	  	   To	  be	  sure,	  the	  vulnerabilities	  of	  the	  authoritarian	  republics	  were	  exposed	  in	  the	  Arab	   uprising,	   when	   communications	   globalization,	   enabling	   the	   export	   of	  democratization	   discourses-­‐-­‐pushing	   for	   the	   empowerment	   of	   populations	   even	   as	  regional	   incarnations	   of	   neo-­‐liberalism	   generated	   grievances	   among	   them—precipitated	   the	   Arab	   revolt,	   profoundly	   de-­‐stabilizing	   the	   region.	   The	  Arab	   uprisings	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were	   both	   a	   symptom	   of	   globalization	   and	   a	   backlash	   against	   it,	   a	   continuation	   and	  intensification	  of	  struggle	  between	  those	  seeking	  to	  make	  regional	  states	  transmission	  belts	  of	  neo-­‐liberalism	  and	  those	  wanting	  to	  protect	  the	  indigenous	  moral	  economy.	  	   In	   spite	   of	   the	   opportunity	   presented	   by	   the	   Uprisings	   to	   tilt	   internal	   power	  balances,	  Western	  and	  regional	  intervention	  in	  the	  Arab	  uprisings	  states	  promoted	  not	  democratization	   but	   intensified	   de-­‐stabilization.	   Neither	   leverage	   or	   linkage	   gave	   the	  West	   the	   influence	   to	   peacefully	   promote	   democratization	   while	   militarized	  intervention	   proved	   disastrous	   in	   Libya,	   as	   it	   had	   earlier	   been	   in	   Iraq,	  with	   the	   state	  demolished,	  empowering	  militias	  and	  trans-­‐state	  jihadists	  rather	  than	  democrats;	  even	  when	  intervention	  was	  expected	  but	  not	  delivered,	  as	   in	  Syria,	   it	  encouraged	  rebellion	  and	  with	  similar	  results.	  	  	   Further	   diluting	   any	   democratizing	   normative	   impetus	   was	   the	   global	   norm	  fragmentation	   deepened	   by	   the	   Arab	   Uprising,	   pitting	   the	  West’s	   “liberal	   imperialist”	  “humanitarian”	   interventionism	  against	  Russian	  and	  Chinese	  defence	  of	  sovereignty	   in	  which	  each	  checkmated	  the	  other	  rather	  than	  cooperating	  to	  facilitate	  a	  stable	  regional	  transition.	  Similarly,	  at	  the	  regional	  level,	  Uprising	  states	  became	  targets	  of	  competitive	  interference	  by	  rival	  powers	  backing	  opposing	  forces	  and	  also	  largely	  checkmating	  each	  other.	   Even	   the	   presence	   of	   an	   aspirant	   liberal-­‐Islamic	   hegemon,	   Turkey,	   was	   unable	  make	  democracy	  normatively	  hegemonic.	  Rather,	  external	  intervention	  (sanctions,	  arms	  supplies)	   in	   internal	   power	   struggles	   (Syria,	   Libya)	   magnified	   and	   prolonged	   a	  deepening	   destabilization	   of	   states	   that	   was	   profoundly	   inhospitable	   to	  democratization.	  	  	   As	   regional	   states	   fractured	  under	   the	   effect	   of	   internal	   revolt,	   contrary	  norms	  were	  wielded	  in	  domestic	  power	  struggles	  between	  middle	  class	  liberal	  activists,	  “deep”	  state	   establishments	   and	   rival	   versions	   of	   Islamism	   that	   either	   rejected	   or	   selectively	  embraced	  aspects	  of	  Western	  defined	  democratic	  norms.	  Democrats	  proved	  inferior	  to	  statist	   authoritarians	   and	   Islamist	   radicals	   who	   had	   either	   more	   guns,	   money	   or	  ideological	  motivation—and	  much	   of	   it	   came	   from	   external	   sources.	   Indicative	   of	   the	  negative	   impact	   of	   external—global	   and	   regional—interference	   in	   the	   Arab	   Uprising	  states	   was	   the	   inverse	   relation	   between	   the	   likelihood	   of	   democratization	   and	   the	  intensity	  of	  external	  competitive	  interference:	  where	  it	  was	  most	  intense,	  the	  result	  was	  failed	   states	   (Libya,	   Syria);	   where	   it	   was	   significant,	   Bonapartist	   restoration	   (Egypt);	  and	  only	  where	  it	  was	  most	  muted	  did	  “low	  intensity	  democracy”	  result	  (Tunisia).	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